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Output Adjustment Costs 
in International Markets: 
Taking the Conjecture out 
of  Conjectural Variations 
Robert Driskill and Stephen McCafferty 
Microeconomics in general and trade economists in particular have made wide 
use of the conjectural variations approach to modeling oligopolistic behavior. 
Most users of  this approach acknowledge its well-known shortcomings but 
defend its use as a “poor  man’s’’ dynamics, capable of capturing dynamic 
considerations in a static framework. As one example, Eaton and Grossman 
(  1986)  organize  discussion  about  optimal  trade  policy  in  international 
oligopolistic markets around the question of whether conjectural variations are 
Nash-Coumot, Bertrand,  or consistent in  the  sense of  Bresnahan (1981). 
Their primary finding is that the optimal policy might be a tax, a subsidy, or 
free  trade,  depending on  whether  the  exogenous  conjectural variation  is 
Nash-Coumot, Bertrand, or consistent. 
In this paper, we construct a dynamic differential game of duopolistic trade 
in an international market. We  show that the steady state of the closed-loop, 
subgame perfect equilibrium of our game can be replicated by a conjectural 
variations equilibrium of an analogous static game. The difference, though, is 
that the term in  our steady-state equilibrium that corresponds to the conjec- 
tural  variations term  in  the  static  game  is  itself  a  function of  structural 
parameters in the model. The endogeneity of the conjectural variation allows 
us to pin down the optimal policy in terms of tax, subsidy, or laissez faire, 
depending on the structural aspects of our model.  The optimal policy  no 
longer depends on an assumed, exogenous value of a conjectural variation. In 
our particular model, we find that the optimal policy is an export subsidy that 
credibly shifts profits to the domestic firm. 
Our work also has implications for the empirical study on optimal trade and 
industrial policies of  Dixit (1988).  Dixit employs a conjectural variations 
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model to analyze the U.S. automobile industry. In his analysis, Dixit treats 
these  conjectural  variations  as  “parameters  that  measure  the  degree  of 
competition or collusion in market conduct”  (p, 142). He is most interested 
in the equilibrium values of  the conjectural variation terms as implied by  the 
historical data. However, he does express some concern that such equilibrium 
conjectural variations might be functions of tariffs and other policy variables. 
The term in our dynamic model corresponding to the conjectural variations 
term in the analogous static model is a function of such taste, technology, and 
policy  parameters.  Hence,  Dixit’s concerns about  the  validity  of  using  a 
constant conjectural variation term in the face of policy changes seems well 
founded. 
While our analysis is amenable to easy comparison with works that adopt 
the conjectural variations framework, we do not claim to rebut those critics 
who find conjectural variations a flawed behavioral concept. Rather, we view 
current users of conjectural variations as believing that the concept captures in 
a static framework the long-run behavior of some unspecified dynamic game. 
For our analysis, we develop a duopoly model in which firms incur costs 
associated with how fast they change their level of output. By  positing these 
adjustment costs, we create what James Friedman (1974) has called a “time- 
dependent”  or  “structurally  linked”  dynamic game and cast the duopoly 
problem as a differential game. In  this game, firms take levels of  output as 
state variables and choose how fast they adjust output. 
We  think our approach is a natural extension of traditional duopoly theory 
and  especially  of  the  conjectural  variations  approach.  Even  though  not 
explicit, dynamics lurks just offstage in these static theories. Both Cournot’s 
discussion  of  move  and  countermove and  the  naming  of  static first-order 
conditions as “reaction curves” reflect a concern with dynamics not captured 
in  the formal models. By  explicitly introducing a time-dependent  structure 
into a model,  we  can naturally  address these dynamic considerations. An 
interesting  characteristic of  such  a  game  is that,  in  the  steady  state,  the 
closed-loop, subgame perfect equilibrium differs from the equilibrium of  a 
static, one-shot Nash game. This makes the steady state of our game amenable 
to comparison with conjectural variations equilibria. We  also believe that our 
approach provides  a justification for the reasonableness of  the conjectural 
variations approach. 
Our main result is that output in the steady state of our game is greater than 
it would be in an analogous static Nash-Cournot equilibrium. This holds true 
even in the limiting case where the adjustment cost term that gives rise to the 
intrinsic dynamics of the model shrinks to zero. Our steady-state equilibrium 
can  also  be  replicated  by  a  static  game  whose  players  have  negative 
conjectural variations of  a particular magnitude.  While we  do  not  obtain 
analytic results concerning optimal taxes or subsidies, we  do compute the 
optimal policy for a number of numerical examples. We  find in all cases that 
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is robust  is  gleaned from  comparing our steady state  with  the consistent 
conjectures equilibrium of the analogous static game. We  find that output in 
our  steady  state  is  always  less  than  that  in  the  consistent  conjectures 
equilibrium. Results from Eaton and Grossman (1986) tells us that, in a static 
conjectural  variations  framework,  when  output  is  below  the  consistent 
conjectures level, the optimal policy is a subsidy. 
We  should note that in a companion paper (Driskill and McCafferty 1988) 
we model a dynamic game where the intrinsic dynamics arise from dynamic 
demand. In  that model,  steady-state output is above that of  the associated 
consistent conjectures equilibrium, and the optimal policy is a tax on exports. 
The general lesson seems to be that, while the outcome of  a dynamic game 
can be  replicated by  a conjectural variations equilibrium,  this  outcome is 
dependent on the specific features of  the dynamic game, including values of 
policy parameters. 
4.1  The Model 
Following Eaton and Grossman (1986), among others, we consider the case 
of two duopolists, each from a different country, competing in a third country. 
The government of each duopolist’s respective country is assumed ;o commit, 
prior to the start of the game, to an ad valorem tax or subsidy on the exports 
of the domestic firm. Throughout the game, each firm and government takes 
as  given  the  tax  or  subsidy  imposed  by  each  government.  Each  firm’s 
objective is the maximization of the present discounted value of  profits. 
(1) 
where a is a positive constant and ui is the output of  the ith firm. 
We  assume that costs depend both on the level of output and on the time 
derivative of output, reflecting costs associated with changing output quickly 
rather than slowly. Furthermore, we assume that the cost of changing output 
infinitely quickly is infinite: the force of  this assumption is to make output 
levels state variables that  do not jump  discontinuously but  rather  evolve 
smoothly through  time.  What  firms control,  then,  are rates of  change of 
output. We  assume that both firms have identical cost functions given by 
Both firms face a common linear demand curve, given by 
p  = a -  MI -  u2, 
Ci  = cui + (A/2)(xi)*, 
where c and A  are positive constants and xi 3  ii,  where (.)  denotes a time 
derivative. We  could add a cost term quadratic in the level of output, but we 
believe that it would add nothing to the analysis except increased algebraic 
complexity. 
The key assumption about strategic behavior is that each firm’s strategy is 
restricted to be a function only of the current state, that is, a function only of 
the output levels of both firms. This assumption restricts our equilibria to be 128  Robert Driskill/Stephen McCafferty 
“closed  loop.”  We  briefly  point  out  the  properties  of  the  model  when 
strategies are path strategies, that is, not conditional on the state of the system. 
Equilibria predicated on path strategies have the undesirable property of  not 
being perfect. The reasonableness and usefulness of the state-space restriction 
is discussed by  Fudenberg and Tirole  (1983). Basically, it rules out other 
perfect  equilibria in  which  strategies depend  on  “irrelevant”  history;  in 
particular, it rules out trigger-strategy equilibria. 
Each firm  is thus assumed to solve the following problem: 
max lom  [(a - u1 - u,)u,(l -  ti) - cui - (A/2)x?]e-**dt 
Xi 
subject to 
ii  = xi,  uj = xj(ui,  uj),  i, j  =  1, 2, i # j, 
where ti is the tax or subsidy rate and 6 is the common discount rate. 
state and prove the following theorem. 
The above maximization problems constitute a differential game. We  now 
THEOREM  1: Let 
(3) 
where kii and k, solve the following equations: 
XT = K,  + kiiu, + kijuj,  i, j  =  1, 2, i # j, 
(4)  kii = {[2(1 -  ti) -  Ak&ji)(k, -  6) -  Aki(kii - 6) 
+ 2kii(l -  ti) -  AkiikSji + A(kii - 6)kj;kj 
-  Ak,kjikjj)/A  (kii - 6)(kjj -  S), 
(5)  k, = {[(l -  ti) -  Ak,kjj)(kjj - 6) -  Akiikjj(kii - 6) 
+ 2kij(l -  ti) -  Ak$kji -  Ak,kjj(kii - 6) 
+ kjj(l -  ti) -  Ak,k?}/A(kii -  6)(kjj - 6), 
(6)  kii + kjj < 0, 
(7)  k..k.. -  k..k..  > 0, 
i, j, =  1, 2, i #j. 
11  JJ  ‘J  JI 
If  such k,  exist, then the pair x:,  xz  constitute a stable, closed-loop Nash 
equilibrium for the dynamic game under consideration. 
Proof: We need to show that the stipulated strategies satisfy the Pontryagin 
necessary conditions for the two players. The first-order conditions for player 
i are 
HI  =  -AX, + A,,  = 0, 
-HIur + A,,6  =A,,  =  -[a(l -  t,) -  C] 
+ 2(1 -  t,)~,  + uJ(l -  t,) -  A,kJ,  + A,,6, 
(8)  2, 
(9) 
(10)  -HIu,  + AIJ6 =  Aq  = u,(l -  t,) - ktJkJJ  + AIJ6, 129  Conjectural Variations and International Markets 
where Hi is the discounted Hamiltonian, Hf., is the partial derivative of  Hi 
with respect to  (-),  and Aii,  A,  are the costate variables. Substituting (8) into 
(9),  time-differentiating (8) and substituting into (9),  time-differentiating that 
relation and combining it with (lo), and rearranging, we  get the following 
relation between xi  and ul,  u2: 
(1 1)  ui = Kj + ({[2(1 - ti) -  Akijkjj](kj,  - 6) -  Aki.(k,, - 6) 
+ 2/41  - ti) -  Akiik,bji + A(kii -  6)kjik, 
-  Akijk,,kjj}/A(kii  -  6)(kj, - 6))ui + ({[(l -  ti) 
-  AkUkj,](kjj - 6) -  Akiikjj(ki; - 6) + 2k&l -  ti) -  Ak$k,i 
-  AkVkjj(kii - 6) + kjj(l -  ti) -  Akijk$}/A(kii - 6)(kjj -  8))uj, 
where  Ki  is  a constant.  Hence,  if  kii, k, equal  the  coefficients on  ui,  uj, 
respectively,  then  the  stipulated pair  of  strategies satisfies the Pontryagin 
first-order  conditions.  If  they  also  satisfy  the  auxiliary  conditions  that 
kii + kjj < 0 and kiikjj -  k,k,i  > 0 (i.e., if they satisfy the Routh-Hurwicz 
conditions), then the strategies are also stable; that is, for any arbitrary initial 
values ui(0), uj(0), ui and uj converge to finite steady-state values. Q.E.D. 
In general, we  do not know under what parameter values such strategies 
exist or, if  they do, whether they are unique. In Driskill and McCafferty (in 
press),  we  prove  existence  and  uniqueness of  a  symmetric linear  set  of 
strategies  for  the  special  case  ti = ti  = 0.  In  this  paper,  we  compute 
equilibria numerically for a wide variety of parameter values. 
4.2  The Steady State 
We  wish to emphasize two aspects of the steady state of our dynamic game: 
first,  that  our  equilibrium  can  be  replicated  by  a  conjectural  variations 
equilibrium and, second, that output in our equilibrium steady state is higher 
than it would be in a static Nash-Cournot game played under the same demand 
and cost conditions except with no adjustment costs. 
Setting all time derivatives to zero, we  can derive the following relation 
from each player’s maximization problem: 
(12) 
where 
ui = {[a - c(l -  t,)]/[2  + rj]} - uj/(2 + rj), 
(13) 
We  will refer to (12) as a steady-state reaction curve. 
Now  consider the static conjectural variations analogue to  our dynamic 
problem, that is, the same demand and cost conditions except for the lack of 
adjustment costs. The reaction curve for each player is readily derived as 
(14)  ui  = {[a - c(1 -  ti)]/[2  + O,]}  -  uj/(2  + O,), 
where Oj  is firm  i’s conjecture about firm j’s response to a change in  ui. 
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Note that the steady state of our game and the outcome of  the conjectural 
variations game are identical if Oj  = rj. This means that there is a conjectural 
variation  that  replicates  the  steady  state of  our game.  In  the  conjectural 
variations approach, though, the value of the conjectural variation is taken as 
exogenous,  except  in  the  consistent  conjectures  approach.  The ri in  our 
dynamic  game  is,  in  contrast,  a  function  of  demand,  cost,  and  policy 
parameters. 
To  compare output between the static Nash-Cournot analogue of our game 
and the steady state of our game, we need to know the sign of rj. In Driskill 
and McCafferty (in press), we prove that, for the special case of ti = tj = 0, 
there  exist  symmetric  negative  k,’s  that  uniquely  solve  the  Pontryagin 
first-order conditions for each firm’s maximization problem and that give rise 
to rj’s strictly between zero and minus one. For this case, it is straightforward 
that output in the steady state is greater than output in the static Nash-Cournot 
game, which corresponds to the static case in which 8, = 8,  = 0. For the 
asymmetric case we study in this paper, we are forced to compute solutions to 
equations (4) and (5)  numerically. For a wide variety of parameter values, we 
always find rje (- 1,  0). For rje (- 1, 0), a straightforward  inequality com- 
parison  exercise on  equations (12)  shows  that  output  for  the  industry  is 
unambiguously higher than in the static Nash-Cournot case. 
What  pushes  output  beyond  the  static  Nash-Cournot  level  is  a  purely 
strategic  force  associated  with  the  closed-loop aspect of  our game. In  the 
closed-loop game, each firm takes account of the effect that the value of the 
state variable  has on  its  rival’s optimal response.  Consequently,  each firm 
knows that, if  it expands output, its rival’s response  is to reduce  its rate of 
change of  output, leading to  a lower level of  its output through  time. This 
occurs since the k,’s are negative. Thus, each firm has an incentive to increase 
output even more since this shifts out its future residual demand curve. 
4.3  Welfare 
Following Eaton and Grossman (1986), we measure welfare contributions 
to each country by national product generated in the steady state by the home 
firm: 
(15)  w,  = pu, - cu, . 
We  look only at the steady state in considering welfare effects. Our purpose 
is to compare conjectural variations results with those derived from the steady 
state  of  a  completely  specified  dynamic  game;  our  interpretation  of  the 
conjectural variations justification as “poor man’s dynamics”  is that conjec- 
tural variations equilibria can be thought of as just such a steady state. A truly 
dynamic  welfare  analysis,  while  perhaps  desirable,  is  also  beyond  our 
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While  we  have  no  analytic  results  to  report,  we  did  solve our model 
numerically for a wide variety  of parameter  values  and compute associated 
welfare levels. A representative display of  our findings is presented  in table 
4.1, where welfare  levels  for each country  are shown as functions  of  both 
countries’ tax rates. The table shows that, for a zero foreign-country tax rate, 
the optimal home-country  response is a subsidy of about 34 percent.  For all 
the different parameter values we tried, the optimal response was qualitatively 
the same: a subsidy. 
In the spirit of  Eaton and Grossman, we can also use table 4.1 to analyze 
optimal foreign policy  response. That is, we can think of both governments 
setting  tax  rates  before  the  start  of  the  dynamic  game  between  the  two 
competing  firms  so  as  to  maximize  their  own  steady-state  welfare.  More 
precise numerical calculations than those presented in the table demonstrate 
that the resulting Nash equilibrium would be a 25 percent subsidy granted by 
Table 4.1  Welfare Levels for Various Tax/Subsidy Rates 
TI 
T2  -  .40 
-  .60: 
WI  ,0446 
W2  ,0546 
W1  ,0519 
W2  ,0579 
W1  ,0607 
W2  ,0607 
WI  .0715 
W2  ,0627 
WI  ,0850 
WI  ,0633 
WI  ,1021 
WI  ,0617 
.O: 
WI  ,1244 
W2  .0563 
.lo: 
Wl  ,1541 
W2  ,0447 
-  .50: 
-  .40: 
-  .30: 
-  .20: 
-.lo: 

















































































































Norr: Wl  = country  1  welfare,  W2  = country  2  welfare,  TI  = tax  rate  for  country  I, 
T2  = tax rate for country 2, A  =  1.0, n  = 2.0, c  =  1.0, and 6 = .05. 132  Robert Driskillhtephen McCafferty 
both governments. Much as in the Eaton and Grossman analysis, allowing for 
foreign response leaves the basic results unchanged. 
In  Driskill  and  McCafferty (1988), we  modeled  competing international 
duopolists  facing  slow  price  adjustment  along  the  lines  developed  by 
Fershtman and Kamien (1  987). In that paper, we found that the optimal policy 
was about a 5 percent tax  imposed by the government. We  argued that this 
finding could be understood  with the help of  Eaton and Grossman’s results 
about optimal policy  under different conjectural  variations.  Basically, what 
they found was that, for consistent conjectures, the optimal policy was no tax 
or  subsidy;  for  conjectures  smaller  in  absolute  value  than  the  consistent 
conjecture, the optimal response was a subsidy; and for conjectures greater in 
absolute value than the consistent conjecture, the optimal policy was a tax (at 
least for the case of  linear demand and quadratic marginal cost). In our model 
with  sticky  price  adjustment,  we  showed  that  the  conjectural  variations 
equilibrium  that  replicated  our  steady-state  equilibrium  had  a  conjecture 
greater in  absolute  value than the consistent conjecture. Hence, Eaton  and 
Grossman’s  analysis  suggests  that  the  optimal  policy  would  be  a  tax.  Of 
course, the  Eaton and Grossman results did  not  apply exactly  since in our 
model the terms corresponding to the conjectural variations term in the static 
game were themselves not exogenous but functions of the tax rates. 
In this paper, with output adjustment costs instead of  sticky price adjust- 
ment, analogous reasoning can be used to gain some insight. We find it useful 
to recast the Eaton and Grossman results in our special case of linear demand 
and linear costs. Consider the welfare function (15), wi = w,(ui,  u,). Graph- 
ically,  we  depict  wI in  figure 4.1 as a family  of  isowelfare  curves in the 
(ulr  u,\  plane. The salient characteristics of this graph are that each isowelfare 
curve is concave, with a maximum at 
a-c-u, 
2 
(16)  UI  = 
and with partial derivatives 
(17)  aMliau,  < 0,  auz/i)ul > -2, 
for du,/du, < 0. Note that the Nash-Cournot one-shot game reaction curve for 
the country  1 firm is that line along which  O2 = du,/au,  = 0. 
Maximization of  country  1’s welfare calls for picking the pair (u,,  u2)  along 
country 2’s reaction curve that is tangent to an isowelfare locus. This point is 
illustrated in figure 4.1 as point A. Since the isowelfare curve is concave with 
a slope that decreases from zero along the Nash-Cournot reaction curve for the 
country  1  firm,  this constrained  optimum is  necessarily  to  the  right  of  the 
Nash-Cournot reaction curve. The question answered by Brander and Spencer 
is  how  a country  can  obtain  point A  when  its  firm’s reaction  curve is the 
Nash-Cournot one. The answer is that a subsidy will twist out the home firm’s 133  Conjectural Variations and International Markets 
Fig. 4.1  The welfare maximizing output level for country 1 
reaction curve so as to intersect the foreign reaction curve at point A. To make 
thc point more clear, we write the home firm’s reaction curve when the firm 
is subsidized at rate t, as 
(18)  U, = [a(] - tl) - ~]/[2(1 - t,)] - (~,)(l  -  jI)/[2(1 -  [I)]. 
As t,  decreases from zero, the intercept moves up, and the slope grows flatter. 
An appropriate subsidy can twist the curve through point A. 
Now  consider  the  same problem  but  assume no  taxes.  Instead, consider 
how different conjectural  variations twist the Nash-Cournot  reaction  curve. 
The conjectural variation reaction  curve for country  1 is 
(19) 
As 8,  varies from zero (Cournot) to minus one, the reaction curve twists out. 
Clearly,  there  is  some 8,  that  will  make  the  home-country  firm’s reaction 
curve go through point A, the welfare optimum. Eaton and Grossman have 
proved what this conjectural variation is: the “consistent”  one in the sense of 
Bresnahan (1981) and Perry (1982). With the consistent conjecture, Eaton and 
Grossman  prove  that  the  optimal  subsidy  is  zero.  Hence,  the  consistent 
conjecture reaction curve must pass through point A. For conjectural  varia- 
tions greater  in  absolute  value  than  the  consistent  one, the  optimal policy 
would  be  a tax;  this, for example,  is the  case in our linear example with 
Bertrand conjectures.  That is, the Bertrand  conjecture  in terms of  quantities 
is greater  in absolute  value than  the  consistent  conjecture. For conjectures 
smaller  in absolute  value  than  the  consistent  one, the  optimal  policy  is  a 
subsidy. 
UI  = (a - c)/(2 + 8,) - (uz)/(2  + 82). 134  Robert Driskill/Stephen McCafferty 
Since for a wide variety of parameter  values we compute that welfare  is 
optimized with the imposition of a subsidy, one might guess that r2,  the term 
in  our  steady-state  reaction  curve  that  occupies  the  same  spot  that  the 
conjectural variations term occupies in the one-shot reaction curve, is in fact 
less in absolute value than the consistent conjecture of the one-shot game. If 
this is true, it is of interest not only because it helps us understand the welfare 
simulations  but  also because  it  means that  the  steady-state  output  of  this 
dynamic game  is  always less  than  the  output of  the one-shot  game with 
consistent conjectures. To show that this may in fact be the case, at least in the 
neighborhood where t, = t, = 0, we first calculate r, (which also equals r, in 
this symmetric case) in the limiting case when A +  0. 
The solution to our game obtained  when A -+  0 is called the limit game 
solution. Recall  that  A  is the  cost-of-adjustment  parameter.  If  we were  to 
simply set A  = 0 at the start of  the problem and solve the game, we would 
find  that  the  steady-state  output  of  that  game  is  identical  to static  Nash- 
Cournot. In contrast, as we take the limit as A +  0 of our closed-loop Nash 
equilibrium, steady-state output tends not to static Nash-Cournot but rather to 
some level strictly between perfect competition and static Nash-Cournot. This 
is  a  standard  feature  of  closed-loop  equilibria  of  differential  games  (see 
Fershtman  and  Kamien  1987; Reynolds  1987; and Driskill and McCafferty 
1988, in press). 
We  now state and prove the following theorem. 
THEOREM  2: For t, = tJ = 0, the steady-state output level for each firm in 
the  limit  game of  A -+ 0 is  strictly  greater  than  static  Nash-Cournot  but 
strictly less than the output level in the static consistent conjectures equilib- 
rium. 
Proof: First, we set t, and tJ to zero in equations (4) and (5) and restrict 
ourselves to symmetric solutions  where k,, = k, and k,J = k,,  = k2. Equa- 
tions (4) and (5)  then become 
(20)  k, = {-Ak$[3k, - 261  + 2(k, - S)}/ 
[A(k, - 6)(2k, - 6) + Ak: - 21, 
(21)  k,  = {-Ak,k2[3k, - 261  + 2k, - 6}/ 
[A(k, - 6)(2k, - 6) + Ak: - 21. 
Rearranging (20), we can write 
(22)  k2  = +(kl) = [(Ak: -  Askl - 2)/(-2A)]’’2. 
Consider the value of k, where +(k), = k,. This value, call it k;, is always 
greater than any equilibrium value kT  because of  stability condition (6).  Now 
I$  is given by 
(23)  k, = {(6/3)  ? (1/2)[(6/3)’  + (8/3A)]”2}. 135  Conjectural Variations and International Markets 
Hence, as A +  0, both k, and kT go to --co.  Now, rearranging (22),  we get 
(24)  A  = 2/[2kz + k,(k, -  a)]. 
Dividing (21) by (20),  and substituting (24)  for A in the resulting expression, 
we get: 
(25)  (kJkI) = {-2[3 - (2S/k,)](k,/kI)  + [2 - (6/kl)][l - (Uk,)] 
+ [2(k,/kI)2]}  + {-2[(k2/k1)2  - 1 + (26/k,) - (S/k1)2]}. 
Define :z  (k2/kl)  = -r.  Using  the  well-known  properties  of  limits,  and 
remembering that, as A +  0, kp  -  w, we then have 
(26)  -r  = (6r + 2  + 4r2)/[-2(r2  - l)]. 
Rearranging (26),  we get 
(27)  2r(r2 -  4) -  2(1 + 2-2) = n(r)  = 0. 
Over  the  interval  (- 1, 0),  n(r) is  a  strictly  concave  function,  with 
n( -  1) = 0,  a(0)  = -  2,  and a’( -  1) > 0. Thus, n(r) = 0 once and only 
once  over the  interval  (- 1, 0). Now,  r  = -  1,  which  satisfies  (27), is 
inconsistent with stability,  as it implies that k, = k,, which in turn violates 
the  Routh-Hurwicz  condition.  Hence,  r  is  strictly  greater  than  -  1, and 
steady-state output  is greater than  it  would  be under  static Nash-Cournot, 
which  corresponds  to r  = 0. The consistent  conjecture  for the  analogous 
static problem is given by 
(28)  e,,  =  -1. 
Hence,  in this  symmetric case with  t, = t,  = 0, our steady-state reaction 
curve is always steeper than  the consistent conjecture  equilibrium  reaction 
curve,  and  steady-state  output  is  less  than  under  consistent  conjecture 
equilibrium. Q.E.D  . 
At least for the limiting case A -+ 0, theorem 2 tells us that our steady-state 
reaction curve with t, = t2 = 0 intersects the other firm’s reaction curve to 
the left of point A in figure 4.1.  We illustrate this in figure 4.2.  Now, for the 
given values of r,, we know that a tax will shift our reaction curve out toward 
point A. What complicates our analysis relative to the static one of Eaton and 
Grossman, though, is that changing ti,  the tax rate, changes r, and r,. We are 
unable to determine  analytically how  these changes in  ti change r, and r,. 
Such changes in r, and r, twist and shift both reaction curves, and we have 
been  unable  to  prove  whether  these  twists  and  shifts  can  overwhelm  the 
welfare-improving shift occurring directly from the increase in the tax rate. 
Our numerical calculations suggest that this in fact does not happen. 136  Robert DriskilllStephen McCafferty 
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with O = O,, 
Fig. 4.2  The limit game of A +  0 
4.4  Conclusions 
By explicitly solving a dynamic game, we find that steady-state output for 
two duopolists competing in a third-country  market is greater than the output 
that  would  be  produced  under  identical cost conditions  at a Nash-Coumot 
equilibrium for a one-shot, static game. We also find that our steady state can 
be replicated by a static conjectural variations equilibrium. The gain from the 
explicit solution of the dynamic  game is that the conjectural variation that 
replicates the dynamic outcome is specified as a function of underlying taste 
and technology parameters and is not simply an assumed, exogenous value. 
Given Eaton and Grossman’s (1986) findings concerning the relation between 
optimal taxes and conjectural variations, this result has important implications 
for welfare analysis of the optimal tax.  Furthermore, our dynamic analysis 
points  out that  welfare  analysis  is  perhaps  more  complex  than  the  static 
conjectural variations approach would suggest: for the dynamic analysis, the 
conjectural variation that replicates the dynamic outcome is itself a function 
of  tax  parameters  and  cannot  be  assumed  to  be  constant  across  policy 
experiments. 
For the explicit game we study, we find that the optimal policy under a wide 
variety of parameter values is a subsidy on exports. This finding seems related 
to the fact that our steady-state level of output is less than would arise at a 
consistent  conjectures  equilibrium.  For  the  linear  example  we  study,  an 
implication  of  Eaton  and  Grossman’s  analysis  is  that,  for  conjectural 
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conjectures, the optimal policy would be a subsidy. Eaton and Grossman’s 
result thus suggests that the optimal policy in our model should be a subsidy, 
not a tax. Their result is suggestive, but not definitive, for our model because 
their analysis takes conjectural variations as exogenous and unchanging in the 
face of  policy changes. 
Our results are of course derived from a very specific model. On the basis 
of other work on dynamic games, we think that some of our results generalize. 
Work  by  Driskill  and  McCafferty  (1988)  on  models  with  slow  price 
adjustment instead of costs of  output adjustment also finds that steady-state 
output is greater than would occur at a static Nash-Cournot equilibrium. These 
models can also be  thought  of  as  being  replicable by  a  static conjectural 
variations equilibrium. The optimal policy in such models, though, seems to 
be a tax instead of a subsidy. 
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Comment  Elias Dinopoulos 
The paper by  Driskill and McCafferty develops a dynamic differential game 
with  two firms competing in  a third  market  and  facing output adjustment 
costs. The main finding is that the steady-state equilibrium of  the dynamic 
game  can  be  replicated  by  a  static  game  with  conjectural  variations. 
Comparing the steady-state equilibrium to that of the one-shot static game, the 
authors find  several differences: the  term  that  corresponds to  conjectural 
variations of the static game is a function of  the parameters of  the dynamic 
game; when output adjustment costs approach zero, the steady-state output of 
each firm is higher than that of the static Cournot game and lower than that of 
the static consistent conjectures game; and, when firms face output adjustment 
costs, an export subsidy maximizes steady-state welfare, whereas, in the case 
of price adjustment costs, steady-state welfare maximization requires a tax. In 
the following discussion, I would like to interpret the results of the paper in 
the context of the existing literature on conjectural variations and trade policy 
and offer some remarks on comparative dynamics, steady-state welfare, and 
adjustment processes. 
Bresnahan (1981) introduced the concept of  consistent conjectures in an 
attempt to provide the “right”  alternative to Cournot and Bertrand equilibria 
in a static framework. Eaton and Grossman (1986) used Cournot, Bertrand, 
and  consistent conjectures to  show  that  the optimal trade  policy  depends 
crucially on  the nature of  conjectural variations. They  found that  Cournot 
conjectures require an export subsidy, that Bertrand conjectures are associated 
with  an  export tax, and that  under consistent conjectures free trade is the 
optimal policy.’ Conjectural variations were criticized by Stanford (1986). He 
showed that,  in  an infinitely repeated game with  discounting and  discrete 
time, the only reaction function equilibria that are subgame perfect are those 
with static Cournot or Bertrand conjectures. 
The present paper models the dynamic game using continuous time and 
obtains results that are similar to those of Stanford with respect to consistent 
conjectures. It shows that the steady-state output of each duopolist is different 
than  the  output  of  the  analogous  one-shot  static  game  with  consistent 
conjectures. In this sense, it implies some form of  trade intervention that is 
discussed in the welfare section. One of  the virtues of the paper is that the 
authors do an  excellent job  of  indicating the  formal connections and  the 
economic  intuition  that  relate  the  results  to  particular  assumptions.  The 
discussion of  why  the steady-state output is higher than the static Cournot 
output is extremely useful. The use of numerical simulations to investigate the 
nature of the steady-state solution is common practice in problems involving 
differential games. 
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Most of  the  analysis of  the paper focuses on comparing a  steady-state 
equilibrium to the analogous static game. One of the weaknesses of the paper 
is  that  it  does  not  deal  with  issues  of  existence  and  uniqueness of  the 
steady-state equilibrium.  The  lack  of  a  formal proof  of  the  existence of 
steady-state equilibrium does not allow the reader to compare the results of the 
present  paper  to  those  of  Stanford (1986). Moreover, Fisher and  Wilson 
(1988) show that a static Bertrand duopoly game with a homogeneous product 
and  differential tariffs  does  not  possess  pure  strategy  equilibria.  Conse- 
quently, it is possible that the class of steady-state solutions for the differential 
game with nonzero tariffs might not exist. The issue of uniqueness is equally 
important because the  existence of  multiple steady-state equilibria would 
question the relevance of  comparative dynamics exercises. These exercises 
are used implicitly in the maximization of steady-state welfare. 
Personally, I found the discussion of optimal policies and welfare somewhat 
unsatisfactory. The paper concentrates on policies (in the form of export taxes 
or  subsidies) that maximize the value of steady-state welfare (sec. 4.3).  Given 
the explicit dynamic framework of  the game,  optimum policies should be 
intertemporally efficient  in  the  sense that  they  maximize the present  dis- 
counted profits. Starting at a steady-state equilibrium, any change of a tax rate 
is associated with a time path that drives the system from the old to the new 
steady state. The transition from one steady state to another involves welfare 
changes that should be taken into account when comparing the two original 
steady-state  equilibria.  Samuelson  (1975)  and  Srinivasan  and  Bhagwati 
(1983) show that, in general, a path that maximizes steady-state welfare is not 
necessarily intertemporally efficient in the sense that it maximizes the present 
discounted value of  welfare. The proper way of calculating optimal taxes or 
subsidies in the present context is to have each government maximizing the 
present  discounted  profits  of  its  firm  taking  the  tax  rate  of  the  other 
government as given and acting as a Stackelberg leader vis-A-vis the game of 
the two firms. The optimal tax path of each government will be intertempo- 
rally efficient, and  it  could converge into a steady-state value.  This value 
could then be examined in terms of its positive or negative sign. Indeed, it is 
peculiar to have firms engaged in intertemporal optimization and governments 
in steady-state optimization. If  firms maximize steady-state instead of present 
discounted  profits, I suspect that  there  will  be  no  difference between  the 
steady-state and the analogous static Cournot game output. However, if  the 
proper  methodology  is  followed,  I  have  no  reason  to  expect  that  the 
steady-state values and signs of intertemporally efficient taxes or subsidies are 
the  same  as  those  that  maximize  steady-state welfare.  I  realize  that  the 
computation of  intertemporally efficient policy  instruments is  analytically 
difficult, if  not  impossible.  Perhaps an  appropriate variant of  Diamond’s 
( 1980) methodology’ or even an additional numerical simulation exercise will 
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My final  remark  concerns the symmetric structure  of  output adjustment 
costs. In the present model, each firm faces costs that are quadratic in the rate 
of output change. I feel slightly uncomfortable with this specification because 
it implies that a reduction  in the rate of  output increases costs by the same 
amount  as  a  raise  in  the  rate  of  output.  Models  that  focus  on  capacity 
constraints  assume  that  increasing  output  beyond  a  certain  range  is  not 
possible in the short-run but  that output reduction  does not  affect variable 
costs. I would expect more economic intuition on  the choice and the role of 
the output adjustment structure. 
To  conclude, I think that the paper makes an important contribution to the 
literature of conjectural variations and trade policy. It suggests that consistent 
conjectures  cannot  be  rationalized  by  a  dynamic  differential  game  with 
adjustment costs. However, its normative conclusion, which advocates some 
form of trade intervention, is based on steady-state welfare maximization and 
not intertemporally efficient policy paths. I hope that future work in this area 
will clarify the normative issues that were raised by the present paper. 
Notes 
1.  Cheng (1988) has provided a similar analysis in the context of a home market 
2.  Diamond has proposed a simple expression for the present discounted value of 
that is supplied by  a domestic and a foreign firm. 
a change in welfare from one steady state to another along a convergent path. 
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&‘Omment  Ronald D. Fischer 
In my view, this paper has two main objectives: (i) to provide a foundation for 
conjectural variations equilibrium and a model of  how the conjectures are 
generated  and  (ii)  to  apply  the  model  to  international trade  in  order  to 
determine the optimal tariff or subsidy and compare it to the corresponding 
results of the static model of Eaton and Grossman (1986), henceforth EG. 
Driskill and McCafferty use a dynamic Cournot game with  adjustment 
costs to generate conjectural variations. They show that, in their model, the 
reaction functions corresponding to linear output changes (the instruments) do 
not correspond to those of the static Cournot model. These reaction functions 
can  be  written  in  a  form  reminiscent of  the  reaction  functions of  static 
conjectural variations models. As the term corresponding to the conjectures is 
written in terms of the fundamentals of their model, they conclude that their 
model can be seen as endogenizing the conjectures. This provides support for 
conjectural variations models against the static Cournot model.  But  is this 
really true? Since they restrict themselves to linear instruments, 
xi  = li = Ki  + kiiui + k,uj , 
and consider the steady state x, = 0, the relation (reaction function) between 
u, and u, must be linear. As they have included adjustment costs, it is clear that 
the reaction functions will normally be different from the ones derived from 
a  static  Cournot  model.  Consider  a  better  analogue  of  their  model:  a 
two-period  model  with  quadratic adjustment costs  (the  discount factor  is 
assumed to be zero), 
where subscripts denote periods and superscripts denote firms. Writing the 
profit functions explicitly, 
n;  =  (1 -  q; -  qf)qi,, 
= (1 - qi -  q:)q; -  A(qi -  qi)2,  i = 1,  2. 
Here qj represents output of firm i in period j and A is a constant, common to 
both  firms.  Solving this two-period  model recursively, one obtains higher 
first-period outputs than in the Cournot equilibrium. The reason is that the 
adjustment cost allows the firms to try to precommit to higher output (as in the 
Spencer and Brander [1985] models of investment in research and develop- 
ment). Since the firms are symmetric, higher output results in the equilibrium. 
This replicates the results of the dynamic model, which suggests that it is the 
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different specification (i.e., the inclusion of  adjustment costs) that leads to the 
results and not that the Cournot model is inappropriate. 
This  raises  the  question,  Does  this  represent  support  for  conjectural 
variations? I think it does not. What it shows is that conjectural variations can 
be used as static shorthand to encompass different models that have their own 
logical foundations. The dynamic game studied by Driskill and McCafferty is 
interesting  in  its  own  right,  not  because  it  has  a  relation  to  conjectural 
variations. 
There are two big differences between the two-period model and dynamic 
models. The first is that the solution of the two-period model is nonstationary. 
Second, in the two-period model, as the adjustment cost A tends to zero, the 
solution converges  to  that  of  a two-period  Cournot model. In  the dynamic 
model, output remains larger even in the limit. It would be interesting to know 
the source of this difference. 
Is such a project of supporting conjectural variations desirable? The notion 
of  conjectural variations, though superficially attractive, suffers from internal 
inconsistencies.  Unless conjectures  are restricted  in some way, any equilib- 
rium is possible. Certain seemingly plausible restrictions have been proposed 
but have been shown to be irrational. Daugherty (1985) proved that the only 
“consistent”  conjectural  variations  equilibrium  is  the  Nash  equilibrium. 
Makowski  ( 1987) has shown that  so-called  rational  and reasonable  conjec- 
tures are neither. 
Consider now the second oqjective, that is, the applications to trade. In EG 
(see  their  n.  2,  p.  3861,  the  conjectural  variations  model  is  used  as  a 
convenient  framework  that  includes  conjectures  ranging  from  Cournot to 
Bertrand.  It  is  also used  because  it  highlights  the  source of  the potential 
benefits  from  policy  intervention:  the  difference  between  conjectural  and 
actual responses. 
Driskill and McCafferty confirm the results in EG for quantity competition, 
showing that,  for a range of parameter values,  a subsidy on  exports will be 
optimal. The authors relate this result to the fact that the conjectures  (in the 
conjectural variations analogue of their model) are smaller than the consistent 
conjectures.  Eaton and Grossman have shown that in their model the choice 
between  a  subsidy and a tax  on exports depends  on the conjectures being 
smaller or larger than the consistent conjectures. 
Finding  another model  that  supports the results  of  EG is nice,  but  is  it 
interesting?  In  my  interpretation,  the  models  of  international  trade  that 
analyze profit shifting without home consumption  are examples designed to 
show that the classical propositions of trade theory may no longer be valid in 
a world of imperfect competition. But, as Dixit argues, “It is my belief that 
research will reveal the profit-shifting argument to be of significance in only 
a small number of  selected industries”  (Dixit  1986, p. 291). In EG, the real 
welfare analysis  begins when  home consumption  is included  in the model. 
This type of analysis is difficult to do in the present model. It is in this sense 143  Conjectural Variations and International Markets 
that  I  find that  the real  interest of  the  model  lies in  industrial organization 
rather than in its application to international trade. 
The authors  have  characterized  the  linear  closed-loop solutions  to their 
dynamic  model  (when  they  exist).  Another  interesting  question  is  the 
possibility  of  cooperation. Since the model  is the continuous version  of  a 
repeated  Cournot game  with  adjustment  costs, can collusive  solutions  be 
supported‘? Suppose that the firms decide on the following  trigger  strategy: 
play  collusively,  and, if  the  other firm defects, use  the  above closed-loop 
solution. If detection is immediate, the gains from deviating are zero, but the 
use of the closed-loop strategy in the future represents  a loss with respect to 
cooperation. Thus, the collusive outcome may be supported. In fact, given a 
low enough discount rate, this is probably true even if detection of defection 
is delayed (for related work, see Benhabib and Radner 1988). It does not seem 
to me that such equilibria depend on “irrelevant” history as the authors claim. 
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